



(A)Symmetry in Language: Seit and Bis, and Others1 
 




What immortal hand or eye 




1 In search of symmetries 
 
Daß die Elektrodynamik M a x w e l l s - wie dieselbe gegenwärtig aufgefaßt zu werden 
pflegt - in ihrer Anwendung auf bewegte Körper zu Aymmetrien führt, welche den 
Phänomenen nicht anzuhaften scheinen, ist bekannt. Man denke z.B. an die 
elektrodynamische Wechselwirkung zwischen einem Magneten und einem Leiter. Das 
beobachtbare Phänomen hängt hier nur ab von der Relativbewegung von Leiter und 
Magnet, während nach der üblichen Auffassung die beiden Fälle, daß der eine oder der 
andere Körper der bewegte sei, streng voneinander zu trennen sind. Bewegt sich 
nämlich der Magnet und ruht der Leiter, so entsteht in der Umgebung des Magneten ein 
elektrisches Feld von einem gewissen Energiewerte, welches an den Orten, wo sich 
Teile des Leiters befinden, einen Strom erzeugt. Ruht aber der Magnet und bewegt sich 
der Leiter, so entsteht in der Umgebung des Magneten kein elektrisches Feld, dagegen 
im Leiter eine elektromotorische Kraft, welcher an sich keine Energie entspricht, die 
aber - Gleichheit der Relativbewegung in beiden ins Auge gefaßten Fällen vorausgesetzt 
- zu elektrischen Strömen von derselben Größe und demselben Verlaufe Veranlassung 
gibt, wie im ersten Falle die elektrischen Kräfte.2 
 
These are the introductory sentences of the most famous article ever published in 
physics, Albert Einstein’s ‘Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper’ (1905), in which he 
developed what has become known since as the ‘(special) Theory of Relativity’. What 
makes this passage so interesting far beyond physics is the perplexing fact that it was 
neither new empirical findings nor the fact that existing theories, such as Maxwell’s 
equations, could not account for the observable phenomena that motivated Einstein: it 
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 It is well-known that Maxwell’s electrodynamics - as usually understood at present - when applied to 
bodies in motion leads to asymmetries that are apparently not inherent to the phenomena. Consider, 
for instance, the mutual electrodynamical action between a magnet and a conductor. The observable 
phenomenon depends in this case only on the relative motion of conductor and magnet, whereas 
according to the commonly held view, both cases, i.e., that either the one or the other body moves, 
must be strictly kept apart. Thus, if the magnet moves and the conductor is at rest, then an electric 
field with a certain energy value arises in the environment of the magnet, producing a current 
wherever parts of the conductor are. But if the magnet is at rest and the conductor moves, then no 
electric field arises in the magnet’s environment, but an electromotoric force in the conductor to 
which there is no directly corresponding energy but which - if the relative motion is the same in both 
cases considered - brings about electric currents of the same strength and the same course as the 




was a deep dissatisfaction with the notion that existing theories assumed asymmetries 
where there were no such asymmetries in the phenomena themselves. This want for 
symmetry is not accidental. Three out of the seminal five papers which Einstein 
published in that year in the ‘Annalen der Physik’ start with very similar 
considerations; in each case, the existing accounts are able to ‘salvare apparentia’ - to 
use the old phrase for ‘cover the observable facts’. But nature is not like that: there are 
more symmetries in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy. 
If we were to state it in one of the slogans nowadays so popular in linguistic 
research, we might say that Einstein, when constructing a theoretical account of nature, 
consequently follows a cognitive principle ‘Avoid asymmetries!’.3 He was neither the 
first nor the last one to adopt such a principle. Everybody from the Babylonian 
astronomers up to Galilei considered it beyond discussion that the planets must move 
in circles, and in a way, Kepler’s laws are a stronger deviation from the sacrosanct 
tradition than the ‘Copernican revolution’; it is quite telling that Galilei violently 
advocated the latter, but never accepted the former. In the case of Einstein’s 
‘Elektrodynamik’ and  its various follow-up articles up to the general theory of 
relativity in 1916, the rigid application of ‘Avoid asymmetries!’ has led to a theory of 
time and space, which (a) was and still is in agreement with the available empirical 
evidence, (b) predicts other empirical observations, many of which could be verified 
since, (c) avoids undesirable asymmetries, and (d) is completely at variance with our 
familiar intuitions about time and space. The reason that people have been so beriddled 
for almost a century by the twin paradox4 and similar perplexing consequences of the 
theory of relativity is not that they have any reasonable argument against this theory; it 
just leads to consequences which are not compatible with everyday ideas of time and 
space. Why? 
In this paper, we will show that the notions of time and space, as they have found 
expression in human language, are fundamentally characterized by asymmetries. This 
will first be done in a somewhat global way first for space and time (section 2); these 
considerations concern very general features of the two notions. In the main part of the 
paper (section 3), we shall have a more detailed look at a specific type of time 
expressions - the apparently symmetrical German temporal prepositions seit (roughly 




2 Time and space in human language 
 
Space and time are two equally fundamental categories of human cognition, and it 
would be very surprising, indeed, if they had not found rich expression in human 
language. All natural languages that we know of show rich and elaborate means to 
express temporal and spatial relations. These means include, for both categories, 
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     -  the lexical meaning of words (e.g., long vs short), 
     -  inflectional marking (e.g., tense marking on the verb, locative case on the 
noun),  
     -  adverbs (e.g., here, now, leftwards, afterwards),  
     -  prepositions (e.g., within, after), and  
     -  various complex syntactic constructions (e.g., verb periphrasis such as will 
have left or combinations of preposition and case, such as in German in den 
Tierpark ‘into the zoo’).  
 
At the same time, we note a fundamental asymmetry between the expression of time 
and the expression of space: in all Indoeuropean languages, in fact, in most (though not 
all) languages of the world, the verb carries an obligatory temporal marking.5 This 
marking may indicate tense or aspect; sometimes, it indicates both. In these languages, 
it is not left at the speaker’s discretion to express temporality - the structural properties 
of the language require it. By contrast, there is no language,  in which purely structural 
reasons force the speaker to express space: the speaker may, but need not, say where 
something happened or was the case. It seems, therefore, that time is much deeper 
rooted in the structure of natural language than space. 
There is no ready explanation for this striking asymmetry. Various speculations 
come to mind. Thus, the process of speaking as well as the process of hearing is 
temporal but not spatial - one word is processed after the other.6 But this fact does not 
explain why the expression of temporality is obligatory in so many languages. So, 
while time and space may well be equally fundamental to human cognition, there is a 
fundamental asymmetry in the way in which human language, being an essential part 
of human cognition, treats these categories. We shall now see how this preference for 





Spatial expressions describe where something is or takes place.7 In the most 
straightforward case, they locate some object in relation to some other object, as in (1). 
But as (2) shows, the situation  may be more complex, since there is no object to be 
located: 
 
(1)  The bill was under a book. 
(2)  It was hot under the roof. 
 
Hence, it is more appropriate to say that a place with certain properties - for example 
the property that there is a bill or that it is hot there - is spatially related to a place with 
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some other property - for example the property that it is under a book or under a roof.8 
This pattern is found in all languages, although its morphosyntactical realization varies 
considerably across and even within languages. In each case, however, it presupposes 
some kind of spatial structure, on which the relations between the two places - the one 
which is located, and the one in relation to which it is located - are based. In (1) and 
(2), the underlying spatial structure is what one might call the ‘normal perceptual 
space’, as experienced by human beings in everyday action and perception. As any 
structure, this space can be characterized by its elements - these are the places - and by 
the relations which obtain between these elements. In the normal perceptual space, 
these relations are of two types. There are, first, the ‘three dimensions’, as exemplified 
in spatial expressions as A is to the left of B, A is behind B, A is beneath B, and, 
second, there are ‘neighbourhood relations’ or ‘topological relations’, as exemplified 
by A is in B, A is out of B, A is at B, and similar ones.  
An examination of spatial expressions in any language rapidly shows that this 
twofold structure may be subject to a number of modifications. It can be strengthened, 
for example by adding a metric (two meters behind the tree); and it can be weakened, 
for example by reducing the three dimensions to two, one or possibly even zero, as is 
illustrated by (3a-c): 
 
(3)  a. Boston is above New York (on a map) 
 b. ... a point on a straight line (in mathematics) 
 c. ... a flaw in the argument 
 
Each of these cases - and there are many other examples - raises a number of 
descriptive problems. Why, for example, is Boston ‘above’ New York, why is the 
point ‘on’ the line, but the flaw ‘in’ the argument? But even in the simplest case, the 
normal perceptual space, successful spatial reference requires more than the mere 
existence of three dimensions. These dimensions must be kept apart and individually 
characterized in such a way that they can be identified in the given speech situation: 
how do we know what is ‘vertical’, what is ‘horizontal’, and what is ‘transversal’? 
Languages have found various ways to solve this problem. But the most common 
strategy, again found in all Indoeuropean languages and in most (though not all) 
others, is to exploit the asymmetries of the human body. The basic orientation point, 
the ‘origo’ of the system of spatial reference, is given by the canonical position 
(standing, body and head upright) of some person. Most often, this person is the actual 
speaker in the given communicative situation; but it may also be the actual addressee, 
or it may be the imaginary position of a person (for example the canonical position of a 
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dimension’ of spatial adverbials such as In Leipzig, we had an accident in the sense of ‘When we 
were in Leipzig, we had an accident’. Note that the initial adverbial also suggests a temporal contrast 




car driver, which then defines what is left and what is right in a car). With this person 
as a basic anchoring point, the three dimensions are characterized in terms of six 
vectors: up and down, front and back, left and right. Up is given by the position of the 
head, down is given by the position of the feet. Front is defined by the direction of 
gaze, back is the opposite direction. Left and right is by far the most problematic half-
dimensions, as reflected, for example, by the fact that children, and sometimes adults, 
often confuse them. But there are also body asymmetries in this regard: left is that side, 
where most people have their heart, and right is the opposite side (if this sounds silly, 
try a better definition of ‘left’!). 
Body asymmetries are not the only way to characterize dimensions such as to make 
them fit for spatial reference. The ‘vertical’ dimension, for example, is often 
interpreted in terms of the ‘direction of gravity’, which, when the orientation-giver is 
in canonical position (on earth!), more or less coincides with the head-foot asymmetry. 
But when these two definitions are at variance (for example when the speaker is lying 
in bed), either the one or the other may be used, and the speaker’s choice depends on a 
number of criteria. As a rule, the body asymmetry is normally given more weight than 
gravity, but there are situations in which gravity wins out. Similar body-independent 
definitions are hardly possible for ‘left-right’ and ‘front-back’: there is no physical 
force, no general factor that would allow us to define that some place is ‘left’ rather 
than ‘right’. What is possible, however, and in fact used in many languages, is the use 
of other asymmetrical objects, a possibility which is extensively discussed in Lang 
(1990, 2001). A typical example would be a house with its ‘front side’ and its ‘back 
side’, its ‘roof’ and its ‘cellar’. Note, however, that houses have no intrinsic left-right 
asymmetry, and hence, do not offer themselves for a characterisation of this dimension 
with its two half-axes. If we talk about the left side or the right side of a house, we do 
it in relation to a certain direction of gaze, hence we again use body asymmetries. 
There are other, and more complicated, possibilities, which we will not examine 
here. The crucial point should be clear: The structure of space, as it underlies spatial 
expressions, is fundamentally characterized by asymmetries. This fact has many 
repercussions in the concrete meaning of spatial terms. A clear  example are ‘dimen-
sional adjectives’: long and short, thick and thin are symmetrical, but only at first 
glance; as Bierwisch & Lang (1987, 1989) have demonstrated in detail, their 
functioning is crucially based on an asymmetry. This is perhaps the best-investigated 
case of asymmetrical spatial terms, but it is surely not the only one. German, for 
example, has two spatial prepositions for the ‘upper’ side of verticality: A war auf dem 
Tisch and A war über dem Tisch; both of them locate A ‘higher’ than the table, the 
difference being whether A is in contact with the table or not. The corresponding term 
for the ‘lower’ side of verticality conflates these two spatial constellations: in A war 
unter dem Tisch, A might be in contact with the table or not; it is only required that it 
is lower than the table (or actually, some relevant part of the table).9 These are only 
two out of the many asymmetries in the meaning of seemingly parallel terms, as we 
find them in all languages. But they are not mandatory; French, for example, has sur 
and au-dessus de as well as sous and au-dessous de, hence is completely symmetrical 
for both half-axes.  The underlying asymmetries of the three dimensions, however, as 
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discussed above, are mandatory: there may be various ways to characterize them - but 





One wonders whether there is more than a vague family resemblance among the 
various notions of time across disciplines, such as, for instance, biological time, time 
of modern physics, time as Kantian "Form der inneren Anschauung" and hence a 
necessary precondition of all human cognition, and subjective time, as influenced for 
example by drugs (see, for example, Whitrow (1980), Butterworth (1999)). It is even 
doubtful, whether the expression of time across languages - and this is what we are 
interested here - is based on the same concept of time. Life in modern societies is 
organized around metrical calendar time, and we take calendaric expression such as in 
the year of 1942, for three hours and twentyfive minutes, etc., for self-evident. But 
many cultures do not have such a concept of metrical time, nor the notion of one 
historical reference event to which everything can be related. Even where calendaric 
time in this sense exists, it is a fairly recent cultural achievement. But there are some 
features of temporal structure that, as far as we know, are reflected in all languages. 
These include: 
 
(a) Time, whatever it is, can be divided into smaller segments - time spans or 
intervals. 
(b) Temporal intervals by themselves have no qualitative properties; they are 
neither green nor blue, and they don't have handles. They are just after each 
other or contained in each other. 
 (c) Time intervals may be long or short in duration. 
(d) There are topological relations between time spans: If A and B are intervals, 
then A may be (fully or partly) included in B or in the neighbourhood of B. 
(e) There is an order relation on temporal intervals: If A and B are intervals, 
which are not (fully or partly) included in each other, then either A precedes B 
or B precedes A. 
(f)  There is a distinguished interval, the ‘origo’ which we may call "the time of 
present experience". Everything before that is accessible to us only by memory, 
everything later only by expectation. 
 
There are two sources of asymmetry in this list of time features. First, not all time 
concepts have a ‘distinguished moment of present experience’, as mentioned under (f);  
in the time of physics, for example, it plays no role. But such a ‘temporal origo’ is 
crucial to the way in which languages encode temporal relations - and just as in the 
case of the normal perceptual space, it leads to a fundamental asymmetry. For us 
humans, past time - the time before this moment - is essentially different from future 
time - the time after this moment. The former time - or more precisely, whatever is 
associated with the time intervals of the past - is fixed, and whatever was the case at 
some time span in the past cannot be changed; the only access to them is in memory. 
Future events or states only have a certain likelihood; they only exist in our 




precedence order stated under (e); it gives rise to the ‘non-reversability of time’ in 
human experience. Note that these two kind of asymmetries must be clearly kept apart. 
Biological aging is, judging from our experience, not reversable, and hence crucial to 
the biological concept of time, just as it is for some philosophical concepts of time, 
such as Heidegger’s. But the notion of ‘aging’ is very different from what counts as 
past, present or future. In other words, there is the ‘earlier-later asymmetry’, which is 
related to the linear order of events, and there is the ‘past-present-future asymmetry’, 
which is related to memory, perception and expectation. Both of them are crucial to the 
expression of time in natural language, and all languages on the world systematically 
exploit them. This is minimally done by a number of adverbials in the lexical system; 
all languages have a rich repertoire of simple or compound adverbial constructions. 
Most often, it is also done in the grammatical system itself, thus giving rise to the 
verbal categories of tense and aspect. 
In whichever way the expression of time is organized in a particular language, the 
two fundamental asymmetries have, just as in the case of spatial structure, numerous 
repercussions in the meaning of individual items. Thus, it appears that the system of 
past reference is always richer, or at least as rich, as the system of future reference; like 
old people, languages prefer to talk about the past. Intuitively, such an asymmetry in 
the system seems to make sense: the future is uncertain, and there is not so very much 
to be said about it (although: why not?). But we also find asymmetries where there 
seems to be no such reason, for example with respect to temporal precedence. Many 
languages have a grammatical ‘perfect marker’, which refers to a ‘posttime’; thus to 
have slept relates to some interval after some sleeping interval (see Musan (2000)). 
The opposite case, i.e., the grammatical marking of some ‘pretime’, is extremely rare. 
It is not obvious why languages have this preference; after all, we are as often in the 
pretime of sleeping as in the posttime of sleeping. In the next section, we will have a 
close look at another such case of asymmetry in the expression of time. 
 
 
3 The case of German seit and bis 
 
3.1 The apparent symmetry of seit- and bis-adverbials 
 
Seit-adverbials and bis-adverbials are limit-specifying temporal adverbials, that is, they 
introduce time intervals by specifying their beginning and their end. But both seit-
adverbials and bis-adverbials name only one of these temporal limits explicitly; the 
other limit is left implicit. Thus, while the explicit complement of the preposition seit 
(‘since’) names the beginning of the introduced time interval, the complement of the 
preposition bis (‘until’) names the end of the introduced time interval.10 This is shown 
in (4). While in (4a) Maria’s presence in Berlin is asserted to have begun yesterday, 
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her presence in Berlin is asserted to end tomorrow in (4b).11  
 
(4) a. Maria ist (die ganze Zeit) seit gestern in Berlin. 
  Maria is (the whole time) since yesterday in Berlin 
 b. Maria ist (die ganze Zeit) bis morgen in Berlin. 
  Maria is (the whole time) until tomorrow in Berlin 
 
Moreover, seit and bis also seem to make use of the time of utterance in a symmetric 
way: (4a) asserts that Maria’s presence in Berlin lasts until now, i.e. until the time of 
utterance (and leaves open whether it reaches beyond the seit-interval);12 (4b) asserts 
that Maria’s presence in Berlin starts now, i.e. at the time of utterance (and again 
leaves open whether it reaches beyond the bis-interval).  
In this sense, seit- and bis-adverbials seem to be symmetric, viewing the time of 
utterance as the axis around which the symmetry is centered. The picture in (5) 
sketches this roughly.  
 
(5)                                         seit-interval      UTT      bis-interval 
____________ ____________ 
    |            |            |   
> 
                                       yesterday                          today                        tomorrow 
 
This, however, is only the very first impression. Bis-adverbials in fact differ in several 
respects from seit-adverbials. Thus, their use of the time of utterance is not the same 
(cf. the discussions in Fabricius-Hansen (1986:223ff), Rathert (1999), Musan (2000, to 
appear)). The aim of the following is to explain in detail why the semantics of seit- and 
bis-adverbials leads to the impression of symmetric behavior and why this impression 
is in fact misleading. 
 
 
3.2 How seit- and bis-adverbials make use of the time of utterance 
 
3.2.1 Seit-adverbials don't 
 
Let us start by taking a closer look at the claim that seit-adverbials introduce an 
interval that starts at the time given by the complement and that ends at the time of 
utterance. 
For the sake of  this presentation, we will adopt a simple system of tense inter-
pretation that uses three time parameters: the time of utterance or speech time UTT, 
the situation time or event time SIT, and the tense time or topic time TT. According to 
common standard assumptions, these time parameters are taken in this paper as time 
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intervals rather than points of time. Simple tenses and periphrastic tense constructions 
are described as relations holding between the three time intervals.13 
The notions of utterance time and situation time are intuitively clear. For the 
purpose of this paper, we assume that the tense time or topic time refers to a time that 
is set by the morphological tense of a clause and we ignore some issues concerning the 
future tense.14 According to the present account, the morphological present tense in 
German simple tense clauses and in present perfect clauses sets an environment of the 
time of utterance or a time after the time of utterance as the tense time of the clause; 
the morphological past tense in simple past tense clauses and in past perfect clauses 
sets a time before the time of utterance as the tense time of the clause. On the basis of 
UTT, SIT, and TT, we define the simple tenses and complex perfect tenses in (6), 
where temporal intersection is indicated by a comma, temporal sequence is indicated 
by __. 
 
(6) Present tense ('Präsens')   UTT, SIT, TT 
 Past tense ('Präteritum')   SIT, TT__UTT 
 Present perfect ('Präsensperfekt')  SIT__TT, UTT 
 Past perfect ('Plusquamperfekt')  SIT__TT__UTT 
 
The situation time as well as the tense time of a clause can be specified by temporal 
adverbials. The explicit specification of the time parameters makes it somewhat easier 
to identify and to distinguish them. This can be seen especially clearly in perfect 
clauses because in these clauses the situation time and the tense time diverge. In the 
past perfect clause in (7), for example, eine Stunde vorher specifies the situation time, 
i.e. the leaving of the storm, while gestern um 12 specifies the tense time and hence, 
the having left of the storm. Hence, the disappearance of the storm is temporally 
located at yesterday 11 o'clock while yesterday at 12 o'clock it was gone already. 
 
(7) Gestern um 12 hatte der Sturm sich eine Stunde vorher verzogen. 
 yesterday at 12 had the storm self an hour before left 
 
The examples in (8) show seit-adverbials as specifiers of the situation time in a present 
perfect clause and in a past perfect clause. In both examples, the seit-adverbial locates 
Eva's sleeping in time: it is asserted to have taken place in the seit-interval.  
 
(8) a. Jetzt hat Eva seit 10 Uhr geschlafen. 
  now has Eva since 10 o'clock slept 
 b. Gestern um 12 hatte Eva seit 10 Uhr geschlafen. 
  yesterday at 12 had Eva since 10 o'clock slept 
 
But crucially, the time interval introduced by the seit-adverbial does end at the time of 
utterance only in (8a). In (8b), the seit-interval intuitively ends yesterday at 12 o'clock. 
                                                          
13
 The system using three time parameters goes back to Reichenbach (1947). There are many 
substantial arguments against this simple analysis (see, for example, Klein 1994); but they do not 
matter for present purposes. 
14




Hence, the generalization that seit-adverbials introduce time intervals that start at the 
time given by the complement of seit and that end at the time of utterance apparently 
was wrong to begin with. In actual fact, the seit-interval in (8) ends at the tense time 
given by the adverbials jetzt and gestern um 12, respectively. 
Let us assume this to be in fact the adequate generalization concerning seit-
adverbials:  
 
(9) Seit-adverbials introduce time intervals that begin at the time given by the 
complement of the preposition and that end at the tense time of their clause.  
 
We have seen this for the case of the present and past perfect in (8). But how about 
simple tense clauses? Recall the present tense clause in (4a), repeated here as (10a), 
and consider the past tense clause in (10b). 
 
(10) a. Maria ist seit gestern in Berlin. 
  Maria is since yesterday in Berlin 
 b. Maria war seit gestern in Berlin. 
  Maria was since yesterday in Berlin 
 
Just as in the examples in (8), the seit-intervals in (10) provide a time frame for the 
situation time of the clause, too. Since in simple tense clauses, the tense time and the 
situation time at least partially correspond to each other, doubts about our 
generalization may arise: how could the seit-adverbial possibly introduce a time 
interval that ends at the tense time when, by specifying the situation time of the clause, 
the adverbial corresponds to the tense time?  
On closer inspection, however, it turns out that this is no contradiction at all: when 
an interval is supposed to end at the tense time, it is in principle free to end at the 
beginning of the tense time interval, at the end of it, or somewhere in between. In 
simple tense clauses like the ones in (10), the seit-interval meets the 'end-at-the-tense-
time' condition by ending at the end of the tense time interval. Hence, the beginning of 
the seit-interval may very well be located at the beginning of the tense time interval – 
as long as its end does not reach beyond the tense time. Consequently, the seit-interval 
is able to specify the situation time that corresponds to the tense time. And so the data 
in (10) are compatible with the generalization in (9). 
To summarize, seit-adverbials do not take the time of utterance as the end of the 
seit-interval but rather the tense time. The impression that the time of utterance is used 
as the end of seit-intervals is caused indirectly: when the tense time and the time of 
utterance correspond to each other, as they do in present tense clauses and present 
perfect clauses, it appears as if the time of utterance provides the end of the seit-
interval. But this is nothing more than an epiphenomenal coincidence. 
 
 
3.2.2 Bis-adverbials don't either 
 
In the preceding subsection, it was shown that seit-adverbials in fact do not really 
make use of the time of utterance. When they seem to do so, this is only a side-effect 




bis-adverbials? Do they indeed systematically make use of the time of utterance? 
Let us first check their readings in simple tense clauses as in (11). Each of the 
sentences has a reading which locates Josef's being in Berlin within the interval 
introduced by the bis-adverbial. (11a), however, also has another reading according to 
which Josef's arrival in Berlin – that is, the beginning of his being in Berlin – is located 
within the bis-interval. In (11a), the bis-interval starts now, i.e. at the time of utterance; 
in (11b), it starts at some time before yesterday.  
 
(11) a. Josef ist bis morgen in Berlin. 
  Josef is until tomorrow in Berlin 
 b. Josef war bis gestern in Berlin. 
  Josef was until yesterday in Berlin 
 
Hence, although bis-adverbials can introduce time intervals that start at the time of 
utterance of their clause, they do not have to do so.  
So far one may generalize that the bis-intervals start at the time of utterance only in 
the case of present tense clauses, but not in past tense clauses. But this does not seem 
right either: when the present tense clause (11a) is put into more specified contexts, it 
turns out that the bis-interval does not even in this cases have to start at the time of 
utterance. Rather, the preferrred reading of the clause is something like "Josef will be 
in Berlin from (the next) two o'clock until tomorrow."15 
 
(12) [Josef kommt um zwei an und] er ist bis morgen in Berlin. 
 [Josef comes at two at and] he is until tomorrow in Berlin 
 
In this example, the beginning of the bis-interval is not the time of utterance but rather 
a contextually salient time that is inferable from the preceding context. Thus, it seems 
that the adequate generalization concerning bis-adverbials is something like (13).  
 
 (13) Bis-adverbials introduce time intervals that end at the time given by the 
complement of the preposition and that begin at some contextually salient time. 
 
Under this view, the choice of the time of utterance as the beginning of a bis-interval is 
just a special case of choosing a contextually salient time. Since the time of utterance 
is always contextually salient, it is an ideal candidate for providing the beginning time 
of a bis-interval. 
Another special case of choosing a contextually salient time as the beginning of a 
bis-interval is shown in (14). Here the left boundary of the bis-interval is explicitly 
mentioned in the clause by the von-adverbial. 
 
(14) Josef ist von zwei Uhr bis morgen in Berlin. 
 Josef is from two o'clock until tomorrow in Berlin 
 
                                                          
15
 The fact that this futurate reading can occur with the present tense is due to the general ability of 
present tense clauses in German to receive futurate readings, especially when they are combined 




Still another option in temporally unspecified contexts is that the left boundary of the 
bis-interval is simply left indefinite or unspecified, as in the past tense clause (11b), 
repeated here for convenience as (15). 
 
(15) Josef war bis gestern in Berlin. 
 Josef was until yesterday in Berlin 
 
The options described above can be realized in perfect clauses, too. Consider the 
examples in (16). They show bis-adverbials in a present perfect clause and in a past 
perfect clause. Under the most preferred readings of the examples, the bis-adverbials 
function as specifiers of the situation time of the clauses. Since the contexts of the 
sentences do not contain any temporal specifications, no such temporal value from the 
context can be used as the beginning of the bis-interval. In (16), the time of utterance 
cannot be taken as the beginning. This is so since in both cases, the situation time of 
the clause has to be located before the time of utterance – simply because of the 
present perfect and the past perfect employed in the sentences (cf. (6)). Given that the 
situation time has to be located before the time of utterance, it cannot be located within 
a time interval that starts at the time of utterance and ends after it. Consequently, the 
bis-interval cannot take the time of utterance as its beginning. Hence, in (16a) and 
(16b), the beginning of the bis-interval is indefinite.   
 
(16) a. Jetzt hat Eva bis 10 Uhr geschlafen. 
  now has Eva until 10 o'clock slept 
 b. Gestern um 12 hatte Eva bis 10 Uhr geschlafen. 
  yesterday at 12 had Eva until 10 o'clock slept 
 
To summarize, bis-adverbials do not take the time of utterance as the beginning of the 
bis-interval but rather, if possible, a contextually salient time. The first impression that 
the time of utterance is used as the beginning of bis-intervals is an epiphenomenal 
coincidence: since the time of utterance is always contextually salient, it can be easily 
used as the beginning of the bis-interval – unless this is not possible for independent 
reasons, as in (16a) and (16b). 
Hence, when bis-adverbials make use of the time of utterance in order to construct 




3.3 Differences in how they don't do it 
 
What did we find out? – On the one hand, seit-adverbials do not really make use of the 
time of utterance; when they seem to do so, this is only a side-effect of the time of 
utterance corresponding to the tense time of the clause. On the other hand, bis-
adverbials do not make use of the time of utterance as such any more than seit-
adverbials do; when they appear to do so, this is only a side-effect of the time of 
utterance being a contextually salient time. 
In other words, the apparent symmetry of seit- and bis-adverbials is due to the fact 




fulfill several crucial interpretive functions. One of these functions is its use as a 
contextually salient time that can fill vague or open time parameters by a concrete 
value; another such function is its use as the tense time in temporal interpretation. 
Thus, the interpretation of seit-adverbials and bis-adverbials is not at all 
symmetrical in the sense introduced above. Der Schein trügt – in this case, as often, in 
a double sense. First, for both seit-adverbials and bis-adverbials the end and the 
beginning of their intervals, respectively, does in fact not always have to correpond to 
the time of utterance. Second, even when it does so, it does so for different reasons. 
Hence, the apparent symmetry is mere illusion. There are more asymmetries in 
language than are dreamt of in our philosophy.  
 
 
4 Concluding remarks 
 
If research in physics is indeed inspired by a principle such as ‘Avoid asymmetries!’ - 
and there is good reason to believe that, explicitly or implicitly, this is what physicists 
have done over the centuries, before and after Einstein - then this does not mean that 
the existence in nature of asymmetries is denied. It reflects a research strategy, a 
certain mental, and maybe emotional, attitude in the way in which nature should be 
looked at, when the human mind constructs theories, or partial theories, of it. But this 
is surely not the approach which the human mind takes when constructing those 
notions of time and space that underly the expression of these categories in human 
language. If we were to state this approach in a slogan, as well, it should rather be 
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